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Abstract 
A model for the specification and analysis of communication protocols called Sys-
tems of Communicating Machines is used to specify a simplified version of the token 
ring protocol. The model uses a combination of finite state ma.chines and variables 
in the specification of each machine, and the communication between machines is 
accomplished through shared variables. Enabling predicates and actions are associ-
ated with each transition; the enabling predicates determine when a transition may 
be taken, and the actions alter the variable values as the network progresses. The 
protocol modeled is a simplified version of the IEEE Standard 802.5. That standard 
also uses a combination of FSMs and variables; however the model in this paper 
is precisely defined, and the communication channels are also modeled by shared 
variables. 
1 Introduction 
Communication protocols are the procedures or algorithms which are used to pass in-
formation between processes residing in different machines of a network, and thus are 
the key to the successful operation of a computer network. Protocols are also often 
quite complex algorithms. For these and other reasons, the specification and analysis 
of communication protocols has been the subject of much research in recent years. A 
considerable portion of this work has been an attempt to find a. model for networks which 
allows a way of both specifying a protocol and analyzing it for correctness and freedom 
from errors. 
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In [9), the importance of formal modeling of protocols is discussed. Reference (10) 
has a. comparison of the various techniques for specifying protocols, a.nd [5] discusses 
the evaluation of formal description techniques. Most of the methods used in modeling 
protocols can be put into one of the following genera.I classifications: communicating 
finite state ma.chines, Petri nets, programming languages and hybrids. A considerable 
a.mount of work has been done in each of these areas, and each seems to have advantages 
and disadvantages both generally and with respect to particular protocols. 
One such model is called systems of communfoating machinu {[6,7]). This model 
uses a. combination of finite state machines and variables. Each station or computer in 
the network is modeled by a. finite state ma.chine, which ma.y also ha.ve associated local 
variables. Accompanying ea.ch transition in the machine is a.n action, which ma.y alter the 
variable values. Ma.chines communicate with other ma.chines through shared variables. 
The ma.chines are tied to the local and shared variables through enabling predicates, 
which determine if a transition may be ta.ken, and actions, which a.re ta.ken when the 
transition is executed. 
In this pa.per systems of communicating machines is used to describe a. simplified 
version of the token ring protocol, a.n important protocol for use in local area. networks. 
This protocol is one of the three chosen by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers for standardization (4) (the other two are Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 
Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) [2] a.nd Token Bus [31). 
In the remainder of this section the protocol is briefly described. In the following 
section the definition of the model systems of communicating machine8 is given, a.nd 
the specification of the token ring protocol follows in Section 3. A partial analysis is 
discussed in the next section and is followed by some concluding remarks. 
Token Ring Protocol 
Suppose we have a. group of children in a. class, sitting in a. circle, and we wish to 
allow only one child to speak a.t a. time. Further, a. child speaking ma.y only do so for a. 
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reasonably short time before allowing another the chance to speak. So we make a rule, 
strictly enforced, that only the child in possesion of a token - say, a ball - is allowed to 
speak. The children pass the ball around the circle. Any child wishing to speak must 
wait until receiving the ball. Upon receiving the ball, he/she may speak for one minute, 
at which time the ball must be passed to the next child. Each child posseses a timer, 
which is set to sound an alarm at one minute when reset. 
This is exactly the same idea used in the token ring protocol. The stations are con-
figured in a circle or ring (see Fig. 1). The flow of data around the ring is unidirectional. 
Each station has two neighbors; an upstream neighbor from which the data is received, 
and a downstream neighbor, to which data is transmitted. Access to the transmission 
medium (the material through which the signals pass from one station to another; for 
example, a twisted pair of wires) must be regulated so that only one station transmits at 
a time, or the signals will interfere with each other, and the messages will not reach their 
intended destination. Each station has a repeater connected to the medium which re-
ceives sequences of bits from the upstream station, and repeats them to the downstream 
station. The station which possesses the token is the transmitting machine; all others 
must only read and repeat bits. 
This simple idea becomes surprisingly complex in its detailed specification. Most 
of the complications deal with the detection and correction of errors; some allow the 
setting of priorities, allowing stations with a high priority message to acquire the token 
more quickly. In this paper we specify a simple, basic version of the protocol in order 
to illustrate how the model systems of communicating machines may be used to specify 
and analyze the complete protocol. 
2 Systems of Communicating Machines 
In this section the model used to specify the protocol is described. A more detailed 
description appears in [6] and [7]. 
A system of communicating machines is an ordered pair C = (M, V), where 
3 
is a finite set of machines, and 
is a finite set of shared variables, with two designated subsets R. and Wi specified for 
each ma.chine mi. The subset Ri of V is called the set of read access variables for ma.chine 
mi, and the subset Wi the set of write access variables for mi, 
Ea.ch machine mi€ M is defined by a tuple (Si, s, Li, Ni, Ti), where 
(1) Si is a finite set of states; 
{2) s € Si is a designated state called the initial state of mi; 
(3) Li is a finite set of local variables; 
( 4) Ni is a finite set of names, each of which is associated with a unique 
pair (p, a), where p is a predicate on the variables of Li U Ri, and a is an 
action on the variables of Li U Ri U Wi- Specifically, an action is a partial 
function 
from the values contained in the local variables a.nd read access variables to 
the values of the local variables and write access variables. 
(5) T; : Si x Ni -+ Si is a transition function, which is a. partial function 
from the states and names of m; to the states of mi, 
Machines model the entities, which in a. protocol system a.re processes and channels. 
The shared variables a.re the means of communication between the ma.chines. Intuitively, 
Ri and Wi a.re the subsets of V to which mi has read and write access, respectively. A 
machine is allowed to make a. transition from one state to another when the predicate 
associated with the name for that transition is true. Upon talcing the transition, the 
action associated with that name is executed. The action changes the values of local 
and/ or shared variables, thus allowing other predicates to become true. 
The set Li of local variables specifies a name and a range for each. The range must 
be a finite or countable set of values. 
A system state tuple is a tuple of all machine states. That is, if (M, V) is a. system 
of n communicating machines, and Si, for 1 $ i $ n, is the state of ma.chine mi, then 
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the n-tuple (St, s2 , ••• , sn) is the system state tuple of (M,V). A system state is a system 
state tuple, plus the outgoing transitions which are enabled. That is, two system states 
are equivalent if every machine is in the same state, and the same outgoing transitions 
are enabled. The initial system state is the system state such that every machine is in 
its initial state, and the outgoing transitions are the same as in the initial global state. 
The global state of a system consists of the system state, plus the values of all vari-
ables, both local and shared. It may be written as a larger tuple, combining the system 
state with the values of the variables. The initial global state is the initial system state, 
with the additional requirement that all variables have their initial values. A global 
state corresponds to a system state if every machine is in the same state, and the same 
outgoing transitions are enabled. That is, a global state consists of a tuple of machine 
states, plus the values of all variables. A system state with the same tuple of machine 
states and the same enabled outgoing transitions is the corresponding system state. 
Let r(s1, n) = s2 be a transition which is defined on machine mi. Transition T is 
enabled if the enabling predicate p, associated with name n, is true. Transition r may be 
executed whenever mi is in state St and the predicate pis true (enabled). The execution 
of r is an atomic action, in which both the state change and the action a associated with 
n occur simultaneously. 
Note that if the values of all variables are restricted to some finite range, then the 
model can theoretically be reduced to a simple finite state machine. Otherwise, an 
infinite number of global states are possible. However, even if the number of global 
states is infinite, the number of system states is finite, because of the finiteness of each 
machine. This may allow a reachability analysis on the system states, when a reachability 
analysis on the global states is infinite. Even when the values of all variables are of a 
finite range, the number of global states in the equivalent FSM system may be so large 




Figure 1: Topology of the Token Ring Network 
3 Specification of a Simplified Token Ring Protocol 
In the protocol of this section, the algorithm has been simplified to permit a brief, formal 
specification of the basic token ring protocol operation. In so doing, however, the attempt 
has been made to remain true to the standard. 
3.1 Simplifying Assumptions 
Those familiar with the sta.nda.rd token ring protocol should have no difficulty in un-
derstanding the protocol. However, the purpose of this specification is to illustrate the 
application of systems of communicating machines to the token ring protocol without 
getting into many of the details. 
The major simplifications are : 
(1) no attempt is ma.de to model the timing. It is assumed that transitions which 
are enabled will occur, eventually. 
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(2) the input and output buffers (that is, the shared variables) of the entire network 
have the capacity to hold the largest frame transmitted on the ring. This means that 
when a station transmits a frame, it may transmit the entire message before checking its 
input buffers for the first part of the message. 
(3) only one frame is transmitted before giving up the token. In the IEEE standard, 
a station may send a.s many frames a.s it can before the expiration of THT, the token 
holding timer. For purposes of brevity, in this section the limit is one message. 
( 4) no errors in transmission. In the standard, much of the complexity of the protocol 
goes into handling errors. 
(5) all messages have equal priority. The standard protocol allows eight different 
priority levels, with an elaborate procedure for raising and lowering them. 
( 6) no active or standby monitors. In the standard token ring, every station contains 
a monitor for various error checking. 
Most or all of these assumptions could be relaxed, and the protocol could be modeled 
by systems. In order to model timing, some restrictions on the amount of time taken 
to execute an enabled transition might be made. For example, when an input character 
becomes available in the input buffer, it may be assumed that the repeat operation, if 
enabled, will be executed within one time unit. 
To model errors, the channels might be explicitly specified, and have various types 
of errors deliberately placed in them, to test error handling capability. For example, a 
"demon" machine might be defined for each channel, which occasionally alters the values 
in the buffer used to pass messages between machines. 
The other assumptions can be modeled by adding variables and states to the specifi-
cation already given below. The frame and token formats can easily be extended to the 
full size given in the IEEE Standard. 
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3.2 Messages and Formats 
In the standard, there are four types of tra.nsm.ission units: binary 0, binary 1, non-data 
J, and non-data K. In the protocol below, the units which are transmitted a.re characters; 
that is, the input message to a station will be a stream of characters from its upstream 
neighbor, and the station will in turn transmit a. sequence of characters to its downstream 
neighbor. There are two special characters which are the symbols 'J' and 'K.' These will 
signal the beginning and end of a message, respectively, a.nd are not allowed inside a 
message. There are two types of messages which will be transmitted : the token, a.nd 
the frame. The token shall consist of the sequence of 3 characters 
[J, T, K) 
and the frame shall have the form 
[J, F, DA, SA, INFO, K, CJ, 
where the DA and SA fields a.re both integers indicating the destination and source 
addresses, INFO is a sequence of characters ( this is the data. block from the higher level 
of the network which is being sent), and the C field is one bit. The C bit is the "frame 
copied" indicator; it is the means by which acknowledgement of messages is accomplished. 
Thus the first character of any message is a J, followed by either T or F, indicating 
whether a token or frame. If a token, the message is then ended by the K. If the message 
is a frame, the F character is followed by two integers indicating the receiving and sending 
stations, and then a sequence of characters which is the contents of the message being 
sent. This is terminated by the K character. Following the K is the C bit which the 
receiving station uses to acknowledge the message. 
3.3 Protocol Specification 
The specification of the token ring protocol consists of the state machine diagram in 
Figure 2, together with the action table which appears in Table 2, and the shared and 
local variables, shown in Figure 3. Table 1 is a list of the tra.nsition names and their 
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meanings; this is not a part of the specification but is intended to help the reader grasp 
the meaning of the transitions. 
Each edge is labeled with a transition name, and the enabling predicate and action 
corresponding to that name appear in the action table, Table 2. The variables, both 
local and shared, associated with each machine are shown in Figure 5. The initial state 
is 0, and initially the buffer variables ( inbuf, outbuf, P DU, and msgbuf) are all empty, 
with exactly 1 exception, and the index variables ( o, i, m, r, p) are set to 1. The exception 
is that the first 3 positions of exa.ctly 1 shared variable on the ring contains the token, 
[J, T, K). The shared variables are inbuf and outbuf, while msgbuf and P DU a.re local 
to each ma.chine. The buffer P DU is the queue of PD Us (protocol data unit, data blocks 
from the higher layer) to be sent out. That is, when the user has a data. block to send, 
the block should be placed into the next available slot of PDU. When an incoming 
message is to be received, it is placed into msgbuf. 
The state diagram of Fig. 2 can be considered as two parts. In the left part, states 
0-4, no PDU, or protocol data unit (a message to be transmitted) is queued, and in 
the right part, states 5-15, a PDU has been queued by the user for transmission. The 
queueing of a PDU occurs when the user of the network, or higher layer protocol, places 
the message to be sent in the buffer P DU; note the enabling predicate of the transition 
P DU - Q from state 0 to state 5. In state 0, the incoming messages are just repeated 
to the downstream station. 
If a PDU is queued, then the transition to state 5 is made, where the token will 
eventually be captured and the message transmitted. In both parts, that is, whether or 
not a PDU is queued, any incoming message with a. destination address of this station 
must be copied into the message buffer msgbuf, if msgbuf is empty. If msgbuf is not 
empty (this means that the higher layer user has not removed the last message received), 
then the "no" transition is taken, so the frame is not copied. (The sender will know this 
because the C bit, the frame copied bit, is not set). 
When a PDU is queued, and the token is captured, the transitions from states 5 to 
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Figure 2: State Dia.gram for the Token Ring Protocol 
7 are ma.de, and the PDU is transmitted. At the end of the PDU, the end of fra.me is 
transmitted, and in state 9 the machine watches for a.nd removes the beginning of the 
frame, until it recognizes its own address. Then a. new token is transmitted and the rest 
of the frame is removed. In state 12, the C bit, the frame copied bit, is checked. If C = 1, 
the frame was received, so the PDU is cleared, and the ma.chine takes the OK transition 
to state O. Otherwise, the frame wa.s not copied, so the machine returns to state 5 (the 




rep repeat character to the next station 
PDU-Q a PDU is queued for transmission 
J first character of a frame or token 
F second character of a frame 
no no, frame not sent to this station 
yes frame addressed to this station 
er copy and repeat character to next station 
K ending delimiter for frame or token 
Ack acknowledgement of frame 
Xmit transmit frame 
EPDU end of protocol data unit 
XEOF transmit end of frame 
reml remove 1st part of frame 
MA my address 
DA destination address 
SA source address 
newT transmit a new token 
rem2 remove 2nd part of frame 
remK remove the K 
miss frame was not received successfully 
OK frame was received 
Table 1: Meanings of the transition names 
In Figure 4, the horizontal line separates the machine and its local variables from 
the shared variables. The shared variable inbuf is shared with the upstream neighbor, 
and outbuf with the downstream neighbor. These are both message variables ( defined 
in [3], Chapter 3), a fact which might be helpful in the analysis of the protocol. The five 
pointer variables are all local, and these are drawn with an arrow pointing to the initial 
element in the corresponding buffer, emphasizing their purpose. 
In the predicate-action table, the action repeat is the basic action of retransmitting 
















Figure 3: Local and Shared Variables of the Token Ring 
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transition enabling predicate action 
rep inbuf ( i) ::/: (0 V J) repeat 
PDU-Q PDU(r) ::/: 0 
J inbuf(i) = J repeat 
T1 inbuf(i) = T repeat 
F inbuf(i) = F repeat 
no inbuf ( i) ::/: MA repeat 
V msgbuf #: 0 
yes inbuf(i) = MA repeat; repeat 
I\ msgbuf = 0 
er inbuf( i) ::/: K msgbuf(m) - inbuf(i); inc(m);repeat 
K inbuf(i) = K repeat 
Ack true outbuf(o) - l;inbuf(i) -v.i;inc(o,i) 
T2 inbuf(i) = T outbuf( o) - F; inbuf ( i) - 0; inc( o, i) 
X PDU(r,p) ::/: 0 outbuf(o) - PDU(r,p);inc(o,p) 
EPDU PDU(r,p) = 0 outbuf(o) - K; inc(o);p - 1 
XEOF outbuf( o) - O; inc( o ); 
reml inbuf(i) #: (0v MA) inbuf(i) -0;inc(i) 
MA inbuf ( i) = MA inbuf(i) - 0; inc(i) 
newT true outbuf(o,o+ 1,o+ 2) - (J,T,K);o - oEB 3; 
rem2 inbuf(i ::/:K inbuf ( i) - 0; inc( i) 
remK inbuf(i =K inbuf(i) - 0; inc(i) 
miss inbuf(i) = 0 inbuf(i) - 0; inc(i) 
OK inbuf(i) = 1 inbuf(i) -0;inc(i);PDU(r)- 0;inc(r) 
Table 2: Action Table for the Token Ring Protocol 
ments 
outbuf( o) - inbuf( i); inbuf( i) - 0; inc( o, i). 
The increment operation (inc) adds 1 to each of its arguments, unless they are at 
the maximum value, in which case they are reset to the minimum value. 
4 Partial Analysis of the Protocol 
One of the best known methods of analysis for communication protocols is ca.lled reach-
ability analysis, which has often been used with the communicating finite state machine 
model [10]. Thie method suffers from several problems, the most notable of which is the 
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combinatorial explosion of states. A similia.r method of a.na.lysis called system state anal~ 
ysis has been used with the model of this pa.per. This method gives some improvement 
over the problems of the CFSM model, a.t least for some classes of protocols [6]. 
Rather tha.n _giving a. complete formal analysis, which would generate a. rea.cha.bility 
tree containing hundreds of states, the approach we take in this pa.per is to show several 
isolated paths in the reachability tree, giving a. flavor of the workings of the protocol and 
showing how a. more in depth analysis might be attempted. 
We will show two key aspects of the protocol. First, from the initial global state, 
the token will be passed from one station to the next repeatedly, a.s long a.s no data 
frames are transmitted. This requirement is basic to the continued operation of the 
ring. Secondly, it is shown that a. station having a. da.ta. frame to transmit will acquire 
the token, transmit the frame, that the frame will be repeated around the the ring; 
that the station for which the message is intended will receive it a.nd acknowledge it, a.s 
appropriate; and that the sending station will remove the frame from the ring, checking 
the acknowledgement bit a.nd taking appropriate action. 
The initial state of the system is shown in Fig. 4. In this dia.gra.m the ma.chines a.re 
shown as a circle; this represents the state ma.chine, in state 0, a.nd the local variables 
of the ma.chine as shown in Figures 2 a.nd 3. The shared va.ria.bles a.re shown positioned 
between the ma.chines which share them. The token is in the input queue ( inbuf) for 
ma.chine i. 
Figure 5 contains the pa.th of the rea.cha.bility tree in which the token is passed. All 
stations are in their initial states except station i. The passing of the token occurs as 
Station i takes transitions J, T1 , and rep, passing from state O to state 1 a.nd ha.ck a.gain. 
This places the token in the input queue for station i + 1. This station may now repeat 
the same sequence, a.nd then the next station, a.nd so on, so tha.t the token is passed 
a.round the ring from one station to the next. 
Having shown that the token will circulate freely, the next step in the a.na.lysis is to 
show that a. PD U, or message to be transmitted on the ring, will be correctly sent and 
14 
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Figure 4: Initial State of the Ring 
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1, • • •I i Ii+ 1, . • In 
( 0, ... , 0, 0, . . . , 0 ) 
i J 
( 0, ... , 1, 0, ... , 0 ) 
i Tl 
( 0, .. . , 0, 0, ... , 0 ) 
i rep 
( 0, ........... , 0 ) 
- - - system state o 
- - - system state 1 
- - - system state o 
- - - system state o 
Figure 5: Passing of the token 
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1 i . . . n 
( 0, ... , 0, 5, 0, ... , 0 ) 
' J ( 0, • • • / 0, 6, 0, • • • I 0 ) 
' T2 
( 0, . • . I 0, 7, 0, • • • / 0 ) 
' Xmit 
( 0, • • • I 0, 7, 0, • • •IO ) 
' EPDU 
( 0, • • • I 0, a, 0, • • • I 0 ) 
' XEOF 
( 0, • . • I 0, 9, 0, • • • / 0 ) 
- machine Mi in state S 
- machine Mi in state 6 
- machine Mi in state 7 
Mi has token & transmits message 
- machine Mi in state 7 
- machine Mi in state a 
- machine Mi in state 9 
Figure 6: Frame Transmission 
received. Suppose that station i has received a PDU (protocol data unit) to transmit. 
This is indicated when the outgoing message buffer, PDU(r) becomes nonempty, and 
station i passes to state 5; see the transition P DU-Q and the corresponding entry in the 
predicate-action table. 
When the token appears in i's input buffer, the transitions shown in Fig. 6 will 
occur. Station i will take the J and T2 transitions to states 6 and 7. In state 7, the 
Xmit transition will be ta.ken, until the frame has been transmittes. Finally the end of 
the frame is transmitted by the EPDU (End PDU) transition to state 8 and the XEOF 
(transmit end of frame) transition to state 9. The reader may confirm this by checking 
the entries in the predicate-action table for these transitions. 
At this point the frame has been transmitted. Next, the frame will be repeated by 
each station around the ring, until it reappears in Station i's input buffer. 
When the frame passes through the station to which it is addressed - say, station j - it 
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( 0, • • • o 0, 0 I 0, • • • I O ) 
t J 
( 0, • • • I 0, 1 I 0, • • • I O ) 
t F no 
( 0, I 0, 2, 0, • • • I O ) 
t yes 
( 0, . . , 0, 3, 0, ... I O) 
t er 
( 0, , 0, 3, 0, ... IO) 
t K 
( 0, o 0, 4, 0, • • • t O ) 
t Ack 
( 0, • , • I 0, 0 I 0, • • • I O ) 
Figure 7: Frame Receipt 
will be copied, if station j has buffer space to do so - and the C bit, the acknowledgement 
will be set. Station j will take the J and F transitions to states 1 and 2. Then, if buffer 
space is available to copy the message, the yes transition will be taken. The frame will 
be copied as it is repeated to the next station (er : copy and repeat). At the end of 
the frame, the C bit is set as an acknowledgement. These transitions take the machine 
through states 2,3, and 4, then back to state 0. If station j does not have buffer space 
available (indicated when msgbuf is not empty) to receive the message, the no transition 
is taken, the message is just repeated down the ring, and the machine returns to state 
0. These transitions are shown in Fig. 7. 
As the frame reappears in station i's input buffer, the reml transition will be taken, 
removing the message until the station's own address is recognized. Then a new token 
will be generated, and the rest of the frame will be removed. These transitions take 
station i through states 9, 10, 11 and 12. Finally, the acknowledgement bit is checked 
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( 0, . • J 0, 9 7 0, , 
tMA 
., 0) ~ rem1 
( 0, . J 0, 10 , 0, • , ., 0 ) 
t newT 
~ ( 0, . , 0, 11, 0, .. . , 0) rem2 tremK 
( 0, . , 0, 12, 0, ., 0 ) • ( 0, ... , 0, 5 , 0, ... , 0 ) t ok miss 
( 0, ... , 0, 0, 0, ... , 0) 
Figure 8: Receipt of Acknowledgement 
in state 12. If the message was copied, station i takes the OJ( transition back to the 
initial state; if not, the miss transition will be taken back to state 5, and the station will 
eventually acquire the token again and retransmit the message. Thes paths a.re shown 
in Fig. 8. 
5 Conclusions 
A model for the specification of communication protocols called systems of communicat-
ing machines has been used to specify a token ring protocol, and a partial analysis was 
also given. The protocol modeled is based on the IEEE Standard 802.5 for the token 
ring protocol, with several simplifying assumptions. The specification shows the appli-
cability of this model to the specification of one important Local Area Net work protocol, 
and its potential for specification of other LAN protocols such as token bus, CSMA/CD 
and slotted ring. The applicability of the model to other protocols, such as data. link 
protocols, has been shown elsewhere [7]. 
Although a. complete analysis was not given - such an analysis would be appropriate 
for a longer pa.per - a. partial analysis was given showing some paths in the reachability 
19 
tree. These showed that certain functions of the protocol - namely, the passing of 
the token, the transmittal of a da.ta frame, and its receipt a.nd acknowledgement - a.re 
accomplished by the specification given. These also suggest how a more complete analysis 
might be carried out. 
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